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SYMPOSIUM: 50 YEARS WITH THE 25TH AMENDMENT 
INTERPRETING THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT:
MAJOR CONTROVERSIES 
Harold Hongju Koh* 
When I teach the amendments to the U.S. Constitution, I have rarely 
counted as far as 25. But after the 2016 election, my colleagues and I at 
Yale Law School founded the Peter Gruber Rule of Law Clinic, a 
practicum devoted to upholding the rule of law and human rights in our 
splintered country. It soon occurred to me that I—and everyone else in 
America—should know far, far more than we presently do about the 
Twenty-fifth Amendment.1 A Clinic student who was an expert on 
* Sterling Professor of International Law, Yale Law School; Co-Founder, Peter Gruber Rule of Law
Clinic at Yale Law School. What follows is a lightly edited and footnoted version of remarks 
originally prepared for delivery at the symposium on Fifty Years with the Twenty-fifth Amendment: 
When a President is Unable to Discharge the Duties of Office, cosponsored on January 25, 2019 by 
the Center for Constitutional Law at Akron Law School and the Ray C. Bliss Institute of Applied 
Politics at the University of Akron. I am grateful to Professors Tracy A. Thomas, Brant Lee, and 
David B. Cohen for their kind hospitality, to the other participants for their instructive papers and 
comments, and to Michael Loughlin and Cara Newlon of Yale Law School for outstanding research 
assistance. As a relative newcomer to the Twenty-fifth Amendment, I am not accustomed to speaking 
at constitutional law conferences where historical questions are resolved by consulting James 
Madison. But I was honored to do that here, learning from the great John Feerick—the father of the 
Twenty-fifth Amendment—who has been an extraordinary friend and inspiration as I have delved 
into this material. I especially thank Professor Joel Goldstein—a dear friend of more than forty-five 
years—for introducing me to the intricacies of the Twenty-fifth Amendment, constantly instructing 
me in it, and graciously correcting my misunderstandings. Finally, I thank my partners in the Peter 
Gruber Rule of Law Clinic at Yale Law School Mike Wishnie, Phil Spector, Hope Metcalf; Fellow 
Matt Blumenthal; and the Yale Law School Clinic student contributors to the 25th Amendment 
Reader’s Guide: Varun Char, Colleen Culbertson, Sameer Jaywant, Chris Looney, Richard Medina, 
Aleksandr Sverdlik, Emily Wanger, Zoe Weinberg, and Nathaniel Zelinsky. We are especially 
grateful to the experts and friends who took the time to review drafts of the Reader’s Guide: 
conference participants John Feerick, Joel Goldstein, and Norman Ornstein; Senators Birch Bayh and 
Russ Feingold; former executive branch officials Avril Haines, W. Neil Eggleston, Ted Olson, and 
John Podesta; journalists Linda Greenhouse, Jane Mayer, and Evan Osnos; Professors Akhil Reed 
Amar, Sarah Cleveland, Richard M. Pious and David Pozen; and Doctors David Goldbloom and 
Howard Zonana. 
1. For present purposes, the most relevant part of the Twenty-fifth Amendment is Section
Four, which states:  
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popular culture undertook an extensive survey of recent American 
television shows and discovered that a surprisingly large number of them 
had episodes discussing the Twenty-fifth Amendment.2 But after taking 
some time to “research” those episodes myself, I came to the grim 
conclusion that in presenting the Twenty-fifth Amendment, every single 
show had made some form of legal error. 
Although Section Four of the Twenty-fifth Amendment is more than 
fifty years old, it has never been invoked. If you haven’t reviewed the 
amendment recently, Section Four provides that just nine government 
officials—the Vice President plus eight executive department heads—can 
separate the President from his powers and duties by voting and 
transmitting to the Speaker of the House and President Pro Tempore of 
the Senate a written declaration that “the President is unable to discharge 
the powers and duties of his office.” Once that notification is sent, the 
Vice President would immediately become the Acting President. Should 
the President contest the claim, those charging his inability would have 
four days to challenge his claim, during which time the Vice President 
would act as President, and both houses of Congress would be called to 
assemble within forty-eight hours to debate and decide the issue. Within 
the three weeks that follow, Congress would be required to vote to resolve 
“Whenever the Vice President and a majority of either the principal officers of the 
executive departments or of such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit to 
the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives 
their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of 
his office, the Vice President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the office 
as Acting President. 
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President pro tempore of the Senate and 
the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that no inability exists, 
he shall resume the powers and duties of his office unless the Vice President and a majority 
of either the principal officers of the executive department or of such other body as 
Congress may by law provide, transmit within four days to the President pro tempore of 
the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that 
the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office. Thereupon 
Congress shall decide the issue, assembling within forty-eight hours for that purpose if not 
in session. If the Congress, within twenty-one days after receipt of the latter written 
declaration, or, if Congress is not in session, within twenty-one days after Congress is 
required to assemble, determines by two-thirds vote of both Houses that the President is 
unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice President shall continue 
to discharge the same as Acting President; otherwise, the President shall resume the 
powers and duties of his office.” U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4. 
2. See, e.g., Homeland: Clarity (Showtime television broadcast Apr. 15, 2018); Madam 
Secretary: Sound and Fury (CBS television broadcast Jan. 14, 2018); Designated Survivor: Warriors 
(ABC television broadcast Mar. 8, 2017); House of Cards: Chapter 43, NETFLIX (Mar. 4, 2016); 
Madam Secretary: The Show Must Go On (CBS television broadcast Oct. 4, 2015); The West Wing: 
Twenty-Five (NBC television broadcast May 14, 2003); 24: Day 2: 4:00 a.m. – 5:00 a.m. (Fox 
television broadcast Apr. 29, 2003). 
2019] 25TH AMENDMENT: MAJOR CONTROVERSIES 265 
the question of inability. A two-thirds vote from each house is needed to 
transfer the President’s powers permanently to the Vice President, and if 
either vote fails, he is permitted to resume his official duties.3 Simply put, 
at any moment, a political crisis could unfold on a remarkably compressed 
constitutional timeline of less than 30 days. Nine sitting executive 
officials could separate a sitting President from his powers immediately, 
with the real possibility that he could permanently be separated from those 
powers in less than a month. And the stakes would be incredibly high. Yet 
this is a constitutional procedure that very few Americans understand and 
a text that even many trained lawyers regularly misconstrue. 
In contemplating this scenario, I grew frightened imagining the cable 
television commentary that might accompany a real-life invocation of 
Section Four of the Twenty-fifth Amendment. In a moment of grave 
crisis, we could face the prospect that our country would be instructed on 
the amendment’s operations by self-appointed “expert” talking heads on 
cable news, who had first read the text of the amendment just moments 
before. 
Given the grave potential consequences of such public 
misunderstanding at a moment of crisis, our Clinic decided that the 
Constitution and the amendment—not to mention the American people—
deserve better than this. So we convened an extraordinary group of 
students at Yale Law School to put together The 25th Amendment to the 
United States Constitution: A Reader’s Guide,4 a text designed to explain 
carefully the Twenty-fifth Amendment’s text and operation to laypeople 
and lawyers alike. In developing this guide over many months, we 
consulted closely with leading experts and studied all of the available 
sources. We looked at all available text, legislative history, academic 
commentary, the limited number of existing relevant judicial analyses, 
and all significant past studies on the issue—including works by many of 
the scholars attending this conference. Through these efforts, we 
developed what we hoped would be a user-friendly “reader’s guide” to the 
amendment that could function as a “one-stop shop”—a single, 
authoritative document to provide a fair and comprehensive reading of all 
interpretive issues relating to the Twenty-fifth Amendment. 
I would urge all of you to read, or at least consult, our Reader’s 
Guide. But realistically recognizing that it is a dense document of nearly 
3. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV.
4. YALE LAW SCH. RULE OF LAW CLINIC, THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED 
STATES CONSTITUTION: A READER’S GUIDE (April 18, 2018), https://law.yale.edu/system/
files/area/clinic/document/mn082208.yls.const.fnl.pdf [https://perma.cc/SA24-9FXU] [hereinafter 
READER’S GUIDE]. 
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eighty single-spaced pages and 350 footnotes, I propose here to give it a 
mini-reader’s guide of its own. Let me discuss the major interpretive 
controversies regarding Section Four of the Twenty-fifth Amendment. 
While the Guide discusses dozens of issues, the amendment’s text raises 
essentially six core questions of interpretation: 
1. Activation: Who may activate Section Four?
2. Inability: What condition qualifies as being “unable to
discharge the powers and duties of the office?”
3. Proof: How or by what evidence would one prove that
inability?
4. Institutional Roles: What roles should different institutional
actors within the government—including the Vice President,
Congress, and the courts—play in initiating and formally
reviewing a controversy under Section Four?
5. The “Morning After”: What happens the morning after the
conclusion of this compressed process?
6. Regularizing Process: If Congress wanted to make this
process more regular, what kind of legislation could it enact?
Our best answer to each of these questions comprises a de facto 
primer on Section Four of the Twenty-fifth Amendment. If you still have 
questions on each issue, or for a more complete answer, please consult the 
relevant section of the Reader’s Guide itself. 
I. ACTIVATION: WHO MAY ACTIVATE SECTION FOUR? 
Section Four may be activated in two ways. First, under the most 
straightforward option, the Vice President plus an eight-person majority 
of the fifteen principal officers of the executive departments can activate 
Section Four by taking a vote and finding the sitting President “unable to 
discharge the powers and duties of his office.”5 
Notice that Section Four doesn’t mention “the Cabinet.” The relevant 
vote here is to be taken by the fifteen heads of the “executive departments” 
that are specified in 5 U.S.C. § 101, and Congress can add new 
departments to that list at any time.6 Thus, currently, nine officials are 
5. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4. 
6. See also 111 CONG. REC. 7938 (1965) (statement of Rep. Waggonner); id. at 7941 
(statement of Rep. Poff); id. at 7944-45 (statement of Rep. Whitener); id. at 7954 (statement of Rep. 
Gilbert); JOHN D. FEERICK, THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT: ITS COMPLETE HISTORY AND 
APPLICATIONS (2014). See also Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 887 n.4 (1991) (noting in dicta 
that in interpreting the Appointments Clause, the Court is not bound by “the fact that the [Twenty-
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needed to initiate the process of removal: the Vice President and eight 
principal officers.7 Our best reading is that acting heads of the department 
may vote, a reading supported by then-Senator Robert F. Kennedy’s 
statements in the 1965 floor debate, which was subsequently accepted by 
most other Senators.8 
The fact that voting power is allocated to the heads of executive 
departments—and not to cabinet members—is relevant because it restricts 
voting to a group of executive officials that is ordinarily both named and 
confirmed by the Senate.9 But the belief that Twenty-fifth Amendment 
participation is limited to Senate-confirmed cabinet members may be a 
common misconception. In one episode of Madam Secretary, for 
example, the Vice President tells an acting Cabinet Secretary, “you’re 
Acting Secretary, so you can’t vote,” which is wrong; just minutes later, 
the Secretary of State announces that “the Cabinet voted tonight to invoke 
Section Four of the Twenty-fifth Amendment,”10 another legally 
erroneous statement.11 
The second possibility for activation, which Dean Feerick has 
discussed, is for Congress to create by law a different deliberative body—
in the words of the amendment, “such other body as Congress may by law 
provide”—to determine whether or not to invoke Section Four.12 In the 
landmark separation of powers case INS v. Chadha, the Supreme Court 
held that all duly enacted “laws” require bicameralism and presentment: 
a majority of both houses must pass a piece of legislation and present it to 
the President for signature or a veto.13 As Dean Feerick points out, if 
Congress has sufficient votes, it can pass a law creating a new deliberative 
body. In this scenario, the new congressional body would replace the role 
fifth] Amendment strictly limits the term ‘department’ to those departments named in 5 U.S.C. § 
101”). 
7. Currently, the fifteen principal officers for purposes of Twenty-fifth Amendment are the
principal officers of the following departments: State, Treasury, Defense, Justice, the Interior, 
Agriculture, Commerce, Labor, Health and Human Services, Housing and Urban Development, 
Transportation, Energy, Education, Veterans Affairs, and Homeland Security. 5 U.S.C. § 101 (2018). 
8. See READER’S GUIDE, supra note 4, at 12-13; 111 CONG. REC. 15,380 (1965) (statement 
of Sen. Kennedy); id. at 15,382 (statement of Sen. Kennedy); id. at 15,385 (statement of Sen. Javits). 
9. At this writing, for example, President Trump’s Cabinet includes the White House Acting 
Chief of Staff and six additional agency heads beyond the fifteen identified in 5 U.S.C. § 101 (2018). 
The Cabinet, THE WHITE HOUSE, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-trump-administration/the-cabinet 
[https://perma.cc/Q6SS-BSNC]. 
10. Madam Secretary: Sound and Fury (CBS television broadcast Jan. 14, 2018). 
11. See READER’S GUIDE, supra note 4, at 11-12. 
12. FEERICK, supra note 6, at 121. 
13. 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
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of the department heads, and become the relevant voting actor, along with 
the Vice President.14 
Note also that these two modes of activation are “either/or,” not 
“both/and”: the relevant vote can come either from the Vice President plus 
a majority of the executive department heads (a purely executive form of 
initiating transfer of powers), or the Vice President plus a majority of the 
other body (which may be largely or entirely drawn from the legislative 
branch). 
Little has been said or written about the limitations surrounding the 
creation of this “other body” by Congress, beyond the requirement that it 
be created by law, through bicameralism and presentment, not internal 
House or Senate rule. Presumably, other constitutional limitations might 
come into play. Consider first, for example, the separation of powers 
concerns that would arise if judges and justices were placed onto such a 
deliberative body—an idea considered and rejected by Congress in 
1965.15 Second, the text of the Twenty-fifth Amendment highlights an 
apparent preference against the new body’s being composed exclusively 
of medical experts, because the inability decision is considered 
fundamentally political, not medical.16 
Upon transmission by the Vice President and the majority of 
whichever of these two entities has authority—executive department 
heads or a new legislatively created body— the President is separated 
immediately from the exercise of the powers and duties of his or her 
office.17 The Vice President assumes presidential responsibilities and 
duties under the title of “Acting President.”18 
14. FEERICK, supra note 6, at 121. While the “other body” may be legislatively created, it need 
not include legislative officials. For example, Congress could decide to make it the top seven Cabinet 
members, or all confirmed Cabinet members, including acting heads, or some other assortment of 
executive officials.  
15. For examples from the debate over the earlier proposal, see, e.g., 111 CONG. REC. 15,382 
(1965) (statement of Sen. Bayh) (“This would not preclude Congress, in its wisdom, from establishing 
another panel, perhaps of the majority and minority leaders of both Houses, the Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court.”); id. at 7,942 (statement of Rep. McCulloch) (“[T]he suggestion has been made that 
a commission be created which might be composed of Supreme Court jurists, elected leaders of 
Congress, and members of the Cabinet.”); see also Miller Center Comm’n No. 4, Report of the 
Commission on Presidential Disability and the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, WHITE BURKETT MILLER 
CTR. PUB. AFF. 13 (1988), http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=
twentyfifth_amendment_reports [https://perma.cc/6XBM-4ZWD]. 
16. See, e.g., Birch Bayh, The Twenty-Fifth Amendment: Dealing with Presidential Disability, 
30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 437, 446-47 (1995) (discussing the need for a removal decision to have 
political legitimacy).  
17. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4. 
18. Id.; see READER’S GUIDE, supra note 4, at 43. 
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This entire process would rapidly generate an extraordinary moment: 
once the initial “inability” letter is received by the Speaker of the House 
and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate, the President is forced to 
decide whether or not to contest the letter by declaring that he is, in fact, 
able. And if he does contest the letter, the decision is thrown into the 
House and Senate, which are required to assemble within 48 hours for 
votes to be held in both houses in 21 calendar (not business or legislative) 
days.19 
II. INABILITY: THE “UNABLE TO DISCHARGE THE POWERS AND DUTIES
OF THE OFFICE” STANDARD 
From the beginning of the process, all decision-makers acting under 
Section Four will be forced to address the next, and most important, 
question: how to determine whether the president is “unable” under 
Section Four? It is important to note that the constitutional term used is 
“unable,” and that no references are made to medical terms or diagnoses. 
Obviously, Section Four covers mental or physical incapacitation, but as 
Professor Goldstein has aptly pointed out, there is no formal definition of 
inability.20 Instead, inability is designed deliberately in Section Four to be 
a flexible standard that can apply to a wide variety of unforeseen 
emergencies. For example, inability could arise if the presidential plane 
goes missing, if the President becomes unconscious, or if—as portrayed 
in The West Wing—the President’s daughter is kidnapped, thereby 
generating a conflict of interest.21 
Section Four’s question is whether the President is unable to 
discharge the powers and duties of the office, not why he or she is unable. 
Inability is determined by a “totality of the circumstances” test, and 
decision-makers must focus on the President’s actual state, rather than on 
the causes of that state.22 Thus, the scholarly consensus is that the drafters 
intended that the amendment cover “any imaginable circumstance[]” that 
might render the President unfit to perform the duties of office.23 
19. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4; see READER’S GUIDE, supra note 4, at 43. 
20. See Joel K. Goldstein, Celebrating the Presidential Inability Provisions of the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment: Dealing with Presidential Disability, 10 CONLAWNOW 119, 132-33 (2019); see 
generally READER’S GUIDE, supra note 4, at 21 (discussing the relevant scholarship on the role of 
medical opinions in the removal process).  
21. The West Wing: Twenty-Five (NBC television broadcast May 14, 2003). 
22. READER’S GUIDE, supra note 4, at 23-24. 
23. Fordham University School of Law Second Clinic on Presidential Succession, Report, Fifty 
Years After the Twenty-Fifth Amendment: Recommendations for Improving the Presidential 
Succession System, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 917 (2017) (quoting KENNETH R. CRISPELL & CARLOS F. 
GOMEZ, HIDDEN ILLNESS IN THE WHITE HOUSE 209-10 (1988)).  
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Decision-makers should focus less on the specific characteristics of the 
inability, and more on the overall effects of the inability: i.e. whether the 
totality of the circumstances suggests that inability prevents the President 
from discharging the powers and duties of his office. For that reason, 
many pages of the Reader’s Guide are devoted to reviewing every 
historically known case of presidential inability. In 1965, Congressman 
Richard Poff, then a leading Republican member of the House and an 
architect of the amendment, argued that being unable to make a rational 
decision would constitute inability.24 In other words, if the President fails 
to demonstrate that he can act rationally, he fails to demonstrate the 
minimum competence needed to fulfill his official duties. A President 
may be found “unable” if he is unconscious, irrational, or on perpetual life 
support. He is not removed from his office; his powers are simply 
transferred to the Vice President because of a serious, but hopefully 
transitory situation. 
Recent speculation surrounding President Donald Trump’s mental 
health and its relevance to the Twenty-fifth Amendment have highlighted 
the importance of this distinction.25 Some pundits have incorrectly argued 
that a President is essentially immunized from Twenty-fifth Amendment 
removal if he previously demonstrated an inability to act rationally on the 
campaign trail, but was elected anyway.26 If a President demonstrated an 
inability to act rationally while campaigning and was elected regardless— 
the argument goes—it should be presumed that the people have taken 
these deficiencies into account yet voted for the candidate anyway, 
thereby “washing out” this objection. But there is no evidence that these 
commentators are correct; nothing in the historical record supports this 
speculation. A democratic vote does not nullify constitutional authority. 
If, for whatever reason, a sitting President were ever unable to make a 
rational decision, the Twenty-fifth Amendment allows for him to be 
24. FEERICK, supra note 6, at 117 (Section 4 provides for cases “when the President, by
reason of mental d[isa]bility[,] is unable or unwilling to make any rational decision, including 
particularly the decision to stand aside.”). 
25. See, I Am Part of the Resistance Inside the Trump Administration, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 5,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/05/opinion/trump-white-house-anonymous-
resistance.html [https://perma.cc/X6NA6N]; Annie Karni, Washington’s Growing Obsession: The 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment, POLITICO (Jan. 3, 2018 09:09 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/
2018/01/03/trump-25th-amendment-mental-health-322625 [https://perma.cc/54FN-QURZ]. 
26. See, e.g., Joshua Zeitz, Why the 25th Amendment Doesn’t Apply to Trump–No Matter What 
He Tweets, POLITICO MAGAZINE. (Jan. 10, 2018), https://www.politico.com/
magazine/story/2018/01/10/25th-amendment-trump-216267 [https://perma.cc/KD7G-FXV5] 
(arguing that the amendment does not apply to “a president who already demonstrated those traits 
when the people, in their wisdom, elected him to office.”). 
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deemed “unable” to discharge the powers and duties of the office, whether 
or not the signs of that inability were visible or even glaring earlier. 
During the Trump Presidency, it has become commonplace to hear 
political analysts say that former Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis, former 
Chief of Staff John Kelly, or former White House counsel Don McGahn 
each at various times played the “adult in the room” to discourage 
irrational behavior from President Trump.27 These discussions are 
striking—and deeply troubling—because the Constitution assumes that 
the President will be the adult in the room. After all, all three of these 
officials are now back in the private sector. If at any time the President is 
unable to function, unassisted, as the adult in the room capable of making 
rational decisions, it is time to question his ability to discharge the powers 
and duties of the office. Irrespective of a President’s actions or tendencies 
that may have been evidenced as a candidate, a demonstrated current 
inability to discharge his official duties rationally can render him unable 
to serve under Section Four. 
III. PROOF: HOW DO YOU PROVE AN INABILITY TO DISCHARGE THE
POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE OFFICE? 
Once Congress comes to an understanding about what constitutes 
“unable,” it is forced to grapple with the issue of how to prove or disprove 
that the President is in fact unable. This is an evidentiary question: a 
question of fact. As Professor Goldstein’s superb article in the University 
of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law makes clear, the Framers 
of the Twenty-fifth Amendment thought that mental, as well as physical, 
illness could render a President “unable to discharge” his presidential 
powers and duties.28 So medical evidence can unquestionably inform the 
inability determination. Still, there is no statement or suggestion in the 
Constitution that medical expertise or diagnosis is required or necessary 
to make the inability determination. In fact, scholars have expressed 
concern that if doctors were to become overly involved in the removal 
determination, their attempts to make medical assessments might invade 
27. See, e.g, Matthew Yglesias, There never were any “adults in the room,” VOX (Dec. 21,
2018 10:30 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/12/21/18151079/mattis-adults-in-
the-room [https://perma.cc/7WGU-87BL].  
28. Joel K. Goldstein, Talking Trump and the Twenty-Fifth Amendment: Correcting the 
Record on Section 4, 21 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 73, 78 (2018). 
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the President’s space, thereby further impeding his ability to carry out the 
office’s duties.29 
A President with no mental illness or disability could still be unfit to 
serve if his erratic behavior indicates that he is incapable of making a 
rational decision. At the same time, it is easy to imagine that nearly all the 
time, a President with a medical condition could still discharge the powers 
and duties in a highly effective manner. For example, an individual who 
suffers from seizures, but could sense a seizure coming on, would have an 
identifiable medical condition. But if that person were responsible and 
competent, he would still be able to carry out his duties and discharge the 
functions of the office at times that he was not afflicted by his medical 
conditions. These thought experiments highlight why the determination 
of inability should not be based exclusively on medical evaluations. 
There has recently been a lot of discussion in the context of the 
Twenty-fifth Amendment of the “Goldwater Rule,” which states that a 
“psychiatrist may share with the public his or her expertise about [a public 
figure’s] psychiatric issues in general,” but that “it is unethical for a 
psychiatrist to offer a professional opinion unless he or she has conducted 
an examination and has been granted proper authorization for such a 
statement.”30 This rule emerged after the 1964 election, when 
psychiatrists began to express concerns regarding Senator and presidential 
candidate Barry Goldwater’s mental state.31 The American Psychiatric 
Association’s Principles of Medical Ethics stated at the time—and still 
states—that a psychiatrist cannot opine on the mental health of a patient 
unless she has personally examined that patient.32 
The “Goldwater Rule” has prompted a flurry of discussion regarding 
Section Four. Does it mean that if the President simply barred any 
competent, unbiased doctor from ever examining him, he could never be 
declared unable to perform the powers and duties of the office and 
removed under the Twenty-fifth Amendment? Upon considering this 
question, the Reader’s Guide concluded that the APA’s principle does not 
function as a complete bar to the constitutional remedy of Twenty-fifth 
Amendment removal.33 First, as explained earlier, the amendment does 
not in fact require a medical assessment, examination, or justification for 
29. See READER’S GUIDE, supra note 4, at 26; John D. Feerick, The Twenty-Fifth Amendment: 
An Explanation and Defense, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 481, 502 (1995) (discussing a conference 
where multiple scholars expressed this opinion).  
30. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, THE PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS, § 7.3. 
31. READER’S GUIDE, supra note 4, at 37.
32. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 30. 
33. READER’S GUIDE, supra note 4, at 37.
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removal. Second, the APA’s principle is not law—it is merely an internal 
rule of a professional association. At most, the APA’s rule makes it harder 
to implement the amendment. Third, it is quite clear from reading the 
relevant scholarship and historical records that Congress could use its 
compulsory powers if necessary, to require the President to undergo a 
medical examination that would provide the desired direct medical 
evidence on presidential inability.34 For these reasons, the issue of the 
“Goldwater Rule” has likely been overplayed in discussions of the 
Twenty-fifth Amendment. 
IV. INSTITUTIONAL ROLES: THE ROLE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT,
CONGRESS, AND THE COURTS 
A. The Role of the Vice President 
If the Vice President assumes the role of acting President, he can then 
exercise all the powers of the presidency without becoming President.35 
The original President is sidelined and incapacitated from acting as the 
Chief Executive, but is still the only elected President that we have. 
However, once the Vice President becomes the Acting President, the 
entire machinery of the executive branch—including the Justice 
Department, the White House Counsel, and all White House staff—shift 
to serve the Acting President in the same manner as they would serve 
anyone exercising the powers and duties of the President himself.36 
As noted above, if this were to happen, the constitutional action taken 
would be a “power transfer,” not removal from office. Thus, it may be 
temporary, the President can seek to regain power if he becomes able 
again, and the decision is not a judgment on his or her morality or place 
in history. Rather, the final decision should reflect his or her capacity or 
ability to discharge the powers and duties of his office, for whatever 
reason. 
What prevents the Vice President from abusing his powers during 
this “acting” period? As a threshold matter, the period of time he serves 
as Acting President is likely to be quite limited. But more fundamentally, 
the limitation on vice presidential action is political. Especially in 
circumstances of medical incapacitation, the Vice President will be 
34. See READER’S GUIDE, supra note 4, at 37-38, 58; see also S. REP. NO. 89-66, at 3 (1965)
(explaining “that Congress should be permitted to collect all necessary evidence” (emphasis added)). 
35. See READER’S GUIDE, supra note 4, at 45; Joel K. Goldstein, The Vice Presidency and the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment: The Power of Reciprocal Relationships, in MANAGING CRISIS: 
PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY AND THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT 191 (Robert E. Gilbert ed., 2000). 
36. See READER’S GUIDE, supra note 4, at 48. 
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hesitant to exceed his mandate by doing too much. When President 
Ronald Reagan was incapacitated by shooting, for example, Vice 
President George H. W. Bush acted diffidently, expecting that President 
Reagan would eventually return to office and not want too many critical 
decisions to have been made during his absence.37 
This process will generally conclude with either the President 
returning to service, as President Reagan did, or the President being 
declared unable. In that case, the Vice President remains as Acting 
President, but never technically assumes the Office of the Presidency or 
the title of “President.” Because there is never a vice presidential vacancy, 
an Acting President under Section Four does not have authority to 
nominate a Vice President to take office upon congressional confirmation 
under Section Two of the amendment. 
B. The Role of Congress 
The Twenty-fifth Amendment does not provide a specific set of 
procedures or guidance on burdens of proof for Congress to follow during 
deliberations regarding a President’s charged inability to discharge the 
powers and duties of the office. The only statement in the amendment is 
that Congress must “determine[] by two-thirds vote of both Houses that 
the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his 
office . . . .”38 
A careful reading of the amendment highlights that each house must 
independently vote for a finding of presidential inability by a two-thirds 
supermajority. Congress therefore cannot add up the pro-inability senators 
and Members of the House and say that it constitutes two-thirds of the 
total. One could imagine a situation in which 100% of one body thinks the 
President is unable, but only half of the other body votes for removal. That 
would not be enough to give the requisite two-thirds in each house for 
removal; accordingly, the President would be restored to office. 
During the twenty-one days Congress has to determine inability, it 
can exercise compulsory process over the President to get relevant 
information. A President being challenged could, and likely would, assert 
various privileges to prevent Congress from gaining information—
whether statutory (e.g., the Health Insurance Portability and 
37. Formal Twenty-fifth Amendment procedures were not invoked after the 1981 shooting of
President Reagan, in part because Vice President Bush was wary of appearing to engage in a power-
grab. See READER’S GUIDE, supra note 4, at 28-30.  
38. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4. 
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Accountability Act (HIPAA),39 the medical privacy act that all of us 
encounter when we go to the doctor), state common law (e.g., attorney-
client privilege), or federal constitutional law (e.g., executive privilege). 
Even so, Congress’s capacity to seek and obtain the relevant information 
would likely overcome these privileges under most circumstances.40 The 
President would, of course, have a chance to make his case to Congress 
that he is in fact able to resume his official duties.41 But if the President 
were to frustrate the constitutional process, such actions could constitute 
a high crime or misdemeanor that could count as an impeachable 
offense.42 Additionally, it is possible that a President’s attempts to 
interfere with the process could be characterized as an obstruction of 
justice, prosecutable whenever the President is not deemed immune from 
criminal prosecution. 
C. The Role of the Courts 
On the fundamental question of a President’s ability or inability to 
remain in office, the substance of the determination appears textually 
committed to the legislative branch, and not to the courts.43 Based on the 
Supreme Court’s opinions in Baker v. Carr44 and more recently Zivotofsky 
v. Clinton,45 the Court would be unlikely to reexamine Congress’s
determination of a president’s ability or inability under Section Four. The 
merits of the substance of the determination of presidential ability would 
therefore likely be a nonjusticiable political question. 
Some might argue that the Court would be similarly unlikely to 
reexamine issues of congressional procedure regarding a transfer of 
presidential powers under the Twenty-fifth Amendment. But the 1993 
impeachment case of Nixon v. United States (which concerned Judge 
Walter, not President Richard, Nixon) suggests that an obvious departure 
39. Pub. L. 104-191 (1996). 
40. See READER’S GUIDE, supra note 4, at 60. 
41. Id. at 63-64 
42. Id. at 64; see also Laurence H. Tribe, Defining ‘High Crimes and Misdemeanors’: Basic
Principles, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 712, 718 (1999) (defining “high crimes and misdemeanors” as 
actions that “constitute major offenses against our very system of government, or serious abuses of 
the governmental power with which a public official has been entrusted (as in the case of a public 
official who accepts a bribe in order to turn his official powers to personal or otherwise corrupt ends), 
or grave wrongs in pursuit of governmental power.”).  
43. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4. 
44. 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (holding that certain Congressional or executive decisions which 
have “an unusual need for unquestioning adherence” qualify as political questions that are non-
reviewable by the courts).  
45. 566 U.S. 189, 195 (2012) (significantly narrowing the “political question” doctrine).
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from the procedural rules in the text of Section Four could be reviewed by 
a court to ensure that the constitutionally outlined process is being 
followed.46 Still, absent patent and material departures from the text 
specified in the Twenty-fifth Amendment, for prudential reasons, the 
court would still likely treat most procedural challenges to the application 
of the amendment as a nonjusticiable political question. 
V. “THE MORNING AFTER”: AFTER INVOCATION OF THE TWENTY-FIFTH 
AMENDMENT 
It is certainly possible that after the roughly one-month-long process 
to investigate inability, Congress could vote not to permanently separate 
the President from his powers. If this should occur, and the President’s 
inability grows more and more apparent, there is no bar to Section Four 
being invoked again. But while there are no legal limitations on the ability 
to reassert Section Four, there are obvious political constraints against 
doing so.47 For example, the President could dismiss the eight executive 
heads who had declared him unable for doing so. So as a practical matter, 
one shot might be all the removal advocates get. 
Still, the President cannot dismiss the Vice President simply for 
being “disloyal.” As Professor Goldstein has pointed out, one of the Vice 
President’s strongest constitutional assets is the simple fact that he cannot 
be fired by his boss.48 And regardless of whether the President is declared 
able or unable, the Twenty-fifth Amendment in no way functions as a bar 
to traditional presidential impeachment. So the Twenty-fifth Amendment 
and traditional presidential impeachment—as well as legislative 
investigation and criminal prosecution—could all work together 
interactively and synergistically over a period of time to achieve a 
President’s removal.49 
46. 506 U.S. 224, 245 (1993). In the Nixon case, the Supreme Court held that the Senate
impeachment of Judge Nixon for federal crimes was nonjusticiable, but noted that “judicial review 
would ensure that the Senate adhered to a minimum set of procedural standards in conducting 
impeachment trials.” Id.  
47. See READER’S GUIDE, supra note 4, at 72-73. 
48. U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 4; see generally JOEL K. GOLDSTEIN, THE WHITE HOUSE VICE
PRESIDENCY: THE PATH TO SIGNIFICANCE, MONDALE TO BIDEN (2016). 
49. For a discussion of how this might unfold in the present setting, see Zucked, 
SKULLDUGGERY (Feb. 8, 2019) https://www.stitcher.com/podcast/skullduggery/e/
58662799?autoplay=true [https://perma.cc/CK6X-HLNB] (interview with Harold Hongju Koh). 
2019] 25TH AMENDMENT: MAJOR CONTROVERSIES 277 
VI. REGULARIZING PROCESS: CONGRESSIONAL POLICY PRESCRIPTIONS
Finally, there is little doubt that Congress is remarkably unprepared
to deal with the prospect of a Twenty-fifth Amendment, Section Four 
scenario. To prepare the country better for the time-compressed, high-
stakes crisis envisioned under the Twenty-fifth Amendment, the Reader’s 
Guide proposes a number of congressional actions. 
First, Congress should pass standing rules, clarify which committees 
have jurisdiction over these proposals, adopt formal standing rules and 
procedures, and establish a standing advisory committee of reliable 
constitutional experts who could be asked for advice on how a Twenty-
fifth Amendment process should operate if it should ever become 
necessary. Second, Congress should establish procedures to clarify some 
of the nuances surrounding the transition of power. To this end, in a joint 
resolution, Congress could simply affirm some of the aforementioned 
agreed-upon interpretive conclusions about the meaning of the text of the 
Twenty-fifth Amendment. 
Once the joint resolution passes Congress, it would be sent to the 
President for presentment. If the President were to veto it, a two-thirds 
vote of both houses would be needed to override the veto. This is a very 
high bar. Particularly if a President presented with such a bill were 
rumored to be “unable,” he or she would almost certainly veto any 
resolution of this sort. Meanwhile, when a stable President is in office, 
Congress will be unlikely to view legislation relating to the Twenty-fifth 
Amendment as a high legislative priority. This, of course, illustrates a 
fundamental paradox of government: when you need action, people will 
be reluctant to act; but until a crisis arises, people won’t want to create a 
fuss by acting to head off an obvious looming problem. 
Once the shadow of Section Four appears, it almost inevitably 
becomes too late for a political solution regarding the country’s 
preparedness for a forced transition. Therefore, it is unlikely that more 
nuanced procedures to regularize the operation of the amendment will be 
developed in the near future. But this inability to develop a standing 
political solution only highlights the need to strengthen our shared 
understandings of the Twenty-fifth Amendment’s terms and processes 
now, in order to minimize the role of partisan advocates in the public 
discourse surrounding potential removal whenever the moment of crisis 
should come. 
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CONCLUSION 
In closing, we should not forget that, almost by definition, Section 
Four will be invoked only in a moment of great stress for our country. 
Once the idea of separating a president from his powers is being actively 
discussed, we are already on shaky ground. But it is precisely at those 
challenging moments that all Americans who love their Constitution—
and the rule of law for which it stands—must take care that the law be 
faithfully interpreted. This will require each of us, particularly in a future 
moment of political turmoil, to retain fidelity to the rule of law and stick 
to principles of consistent and faithful constitutional interpretation. 
In writing our Reader’s Guide on the Twenty-fifth Amendment, a 
primary goal of Yale Law School’s Peter Gruber Rule of Law Clinic was 
civic education. I find it amazing that I didn’t learn about the intricacies 
of the amendment when I was in school, but many decades later, more 
than thirty years after becoming a professor who happens on occasion to 
teach constitutional law. But only a few people in my field, nearly all of 
whom happen to be at this Symposium, really know anything about this 
subject at all. 
For that reason, my parting message is “Teach your children well.” 
You can give them—and your law students and colleagues—our Reader’s 
Guide as a present: it is free and there is an executive summary in case 
they want to get the short version. Teachers should educate their students 
about the Twenty-fifth Amendment, reviewing the entire history of 
previous physical and mental situations that have—or should have—
triggered the amendment. This analysis would connect the Twenty-fifth 
Amendment, and our current political moment, to basic lessons in 
American history. 
When I was in grade school, we learned to type by memorizing and 
repeating that famous phrase, attributed to Patrick Henry: “Now is the 
time for all good Americans to come to the aid of their country.” If and 
when a debate under Section Four of the Twenty-fifth Amendment ever 
arrives, we will be at precisely such an historical moment. We should be 
ready for that challenge whenever it may face us, by arming ourselves 
with a thorough knowledge of how this vitally important, yet so little-
understood, corner of our Constitution should function in a moment of 
high national stress. 
